This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are independently chosen according to the initial probabilities, and are kept the same all through the game. At every stage, players simultaneously choose actions, and announce their actions publicly. For finite horizon cases, an explicit linear program is provided to compute players' security strategies. Moreover, this paper shows that a player's sufficient statistics, which is independent of the strategy of the other player, consists of the belief over the player's own type, the regret over the other player's type, and the stage. Explicit linear programs, whose size is linear in the size of the game tree, are provided to compute the initial regrets, and the security strategies that only depends on the sufficient statistics. For discounted cases, following the same idea in the finite horizon, this paper shows that a player's sufficient statistics consists of the belief of the player's own type and the antidiscounted regret with respect to the other player's type. Besides, an approximated security strategy depending on the sufficient statistics is provided, and an explicit linear program to compute the approximated security strategy is given. This paper also obtains a bound on the performance difference between the approximated security strategy and the security strategy, and shows that the bound converges to 0 exponentially fast.
An LP Approach for Solving Two-Player Zero-Sum Repeated Bayesian Games I. INTRODUCTION I N MANY noncooperative games, players often have their own private information that is unknown to the others. Such asymmetries of information have been seen in economic systems [2] , [3] , engineering systems [4] , [5] , air transportation systems [6] , and security systems [7] . This paper is especially interested in two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games, where each player has a private type that is unknown to the other player. At the beginning of the game, every player's type is chosen independently, once and for all, according to the corresponding prior distribution, and kept as private information. Notice that a player's type is unknown to the other player. At every stage, both players simultaneously choose their actions, which are observed by both players. The one-stage payoff of player 1, i.e., the one-stage penalty of player 2, depends on both players' types and actions, and is not observable by either player. The game is repeated for multiple stages until it ends. The final payoff is revealed to both players at the end of the game. Similar problems were studied in [9] [10] [11] , which used common information based belief to derive backward recursive formulas to find the Nash equilibrium or the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In [9] , assuming the common information based beliefs are strategy independent, the authors decoupled strategies and beliefs, and provided a backward induction algorithm to find subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. Prior work [10] , [11] studied perfect Bayesian equilibrium that consists of a strategy profile and a belief system such that the strategy is sequentially rational given the belief system and the belief system is consistent given the strategy profile [12] . Based on the common information based belief system, Ouyang et al. [10] studied the common information based perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and Vasal and Anastasopoulos [11] studied the structured perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Backward recursive formulas were given in both papers to find the corresponding perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Since our work focuses on computing the Nash equilibrium of the game, and the beliefs are strategy dependent, the works [9] [10] [11] are not applicable in our problem. This paper first studies finite horizon repeated Bayesian games, which is based on our work in [13] . Our first contribution for finite horizon games is developing linear programming (LP) formulations to compute action history based security strategies for both players, whose sizes are only linear in the size of the game tree. Noticing that the size of action history based security strategy space grows exponentially in the time horizon, we further study sufficient statistics of both players for finite horizon games. Previous work [1] showed that a player's sufficient statistics in finite horizon games is stage, its own type, belief over its own type, and regret over the other player's type. However, while a recursive formula was provided to update the regret stage by stage, what the initial regret is and how to compute it remained open questions. Our second contribution in finite horizon games is showing that the initial regret over the other player's type is the difference between 0 and the worst case payoff guaranteed by the player's security strategy for every possible type of the other player and constructing an LP formulation to compute the initial regret. Based on the sufficient statistics, we provide an algorithm to compute a sufficient statistics based security strategy for each player, which is our third contribution in finite horizon games.
We, then, extend the results to infinite horizon discounted repeated Bayesian games. The first challenge is to find out sufficient statistics of players, and the second one is to find computationally tractable approximated security strategies for both players since computing security strategies in infinite horizon discounted repeated Bayesian games is nonconvex [14] . The first challenge was partially addressed in [1] and [15] , which showed that sufficient statistics of a player is its own type, belief over its own type, and antidiscounted regret over the other player's type. As discussed in finite horizon games, while Rosenberg [1] and Sorin [15] provided a recursive formula to update the antidiscounted regret stage by stage, the physical meaning and a tractable computation method were missing. Our contributions in addressing the first challenge are showing that the initial antidiscounted regret over the other player's type is the difference between 0 and the worst case payoff guaranteed by the player's security strategy given every possible type of the other player, and providing an LP formulation to compute an approximated initial antidiscounted regret. With sufficient statistics, we further study sufficient statistics based security strategies in infinite horizon discounted repeated Bayesian games. As mentioned in the second challenge, computing security strategies is nonconvex in infinite horizon repeated games. We construct an approximated security strategy for each player based on the value of a finite stage (N -stage) discounted game, a truncated version of the infinite horizon discounted game. Our main contribution in addressing the second challenge is developing an LP formulation to compute the approximated security strategy for every player, and showing that the worst case payoff of the approximated security strategy converges to the game value exponentially fast over N .
II. N -STAGE REPEATED BAYESIAN GAMES
Let R n denote the n-dimensional real space. For a finite set K, |K|, and Δ(K) denote its cardinality and the set of probability distributions over K, respectively. Symbols 1 and 0 denote vectors with all elements equal to 1 and 0, respectively. For a vector p and a matrix Z, we use p(i) to denote the ith element of p, and Z(i, j) to denote the element at the ith row and the jth column of Z. The transposes of a vector variable p and a matrix variable Z are denoted by p T and Z T , respectively. The ith row and the jth column of Z are denoted as Z(i, :) and Z(:, j), respectively. Given a vector valued function σ(·) ∈ R n , the ith element of σ(·) is denoted by σ i (·), and its transpose is denoted as σ(·) T . Let v(0), v(1), . . . be a sequence of real values. We adopt the convention that 0 t=1 v(t) = 0, and 0 t=1 v(t) = 1. The supremum norm of a function f : D → R is defined as f sup = sup x∈D |f (x)|, where D is a nonempty set. A two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian game is specified by the seven tuple (K, L, A, B, M, p 0 , q 0 ), where 1) K and L nonempty finite sets, called players 1's and 2's type sets, respectively; 2) A and B nonempty finite sets, called players 1's and 2's action sets, respectively; 3) M kl the payoff matrix given player 1's type k ∈ K and player 2's type l ∈ L. The element M kl (a, b) is player 1's one stage payoff, i.e., player 2's one stage penalty, given player 1's type k ∈ K and action a ∈ A, and player 2's type l ∈ L and action b ∈ B; 4) p 0 ∈ Δ(K) and q 0 ∈ Δ(L) the initial probabilities on K and L, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume p 0 (k), q 0 (l) > 0 for any k ∈ K and l ∈ L; The seven tuple is common knowledge of the two players. Let a t , b t denote player 1 and player 2's actions at stage t = 1, . . . , N, respectively. At the beginning of this game, k and l are chosen independently according to p 0 and q 0 , and communicated to players 1 and 2, respectively. Notice that a player's type is unknown to the other player. After the types are chosen, at stage t = 1, . . . , N, each player simultaneously chooses its action that is observed by both players. We assume perfect monitoring and perfect recall, i.e., every player can observe the current actions of both players, and record all action histories of both players. The one stage payoff of player 1, i.e., one stage penalty of player 2, at stage t is M kl (a t , b t ). Neither player can observe the one stage payoff, and the total payoff is revealed to both players at the end of the game.
At the beginning of stage t, the available information of players 1 and 2 is denoted by
. Denote by Σ and T , the sets of strategies of players 1 and 2, respectively.
A quadruple (p 0 , q 0 , σ, τ) induces a probability distribution P p 0 ,q 0 ,σ,τ on the set Ω = K × L × (A × B) N of plays. E p 0 ,q 0 ,σ,τ stands for the corresponding expectation. The payoff with initial probabilities p 0 , q 0 and strategies σ, τ of the N -stage repeated Bayesian game is defined as
An N -stage game Γ N (p 0 , q 0 ) is defined as a two-player zerosum repeated Bayesian game equipped with initial distribution p 0 and q 0 , strategy spaces Σ and T , and payoff function γ N (p 0 , q 0 , σ, τ). In this game, player 1 wants to maximize the payoff γ N (p 0 , σ, τ), while player 2 wants to minimize it.
In an N -stage game Γ N (p 0 , q 0 ), player 1's security level V N (p 0 , q 0 ) is defined as V N (p 0 , q 0 ) = max σ ∈Σ min τ ∈T γ N (p 0 , q 0 , σ, τ), and a strategy σ * ∈ Σ achieving this security level is called a security strategy of player 1. Similarly, player 2's security level V N (p 0 , q 0 ) is defined as V N (p 0 , q 0 ) = min τ ∈T max σ ∈Σ γ N (p 0 , q 0 σ, τ ), and a strategy τ * ∈ T achieving this security level is called a security strategy of player 2. If V N (p 0 , q 0 ) = V N (p 0 , q 0 ), we say game Γ N (p 0 , q 0 ) has a value. Since game Γ N (p 0 , q 0 ) is a finite game, it always has a value V N (p 0 , q 0 ) [15] .
A. LP Formulations of Action History Based Security Strategies
An N -stage Bayesian repeated game is a finite game whose security strategy can be computed by solving a linear program based on the sequence form [16] . The linear program provided in [16] , however, cannot be directly used in our case, because the strategies of both players depend on their own types. Therefore, we adopt the idea of a realization plan in the sequence form [16] , and construct an explicit linear program for N -stage Bayesian repeated games.
Let us first introduce the realization plan. Define player 1's realization plan x I t ∈ R |A| given I t and player 2's realization plan y J t ∈ R |B| given J t as
where a s , I s are player 1's action and available history information at stage s in information set I t , denoted by a s , I s ∈ I t , and b s , J s are player 2's action and available history information at stage s in information set I t , denoted by b s , J s ∈ J t , for all s = 1, . . . , t − 1. Let F t+1 = I t+1 ∪ J t+1 be the full history information at the beginning of stage t + 1, and p(F t+1 ) be the joint probability for F t+1 to happen. Realization plans x I t (a t ) and y J t (b t ) can be seen as the influences of players 1 and 2 in p(F t+1 ), respectively, and joint
and y = (y t ) N t=1 players 1's and 2's realization plans of the N -stage Bayesian game. The realization plans x and y satisfy constraint (3), (4) and (5), (6), respectively.
for all t = 1, . . . , N, and
for all t = 1, . . . , N,
With perfect recall, for either player, looking for a security strategy is the same as looking for a realization plan that achieves the security level of the player [16] .
For player 1's realization plan x, define player 1's weighted future security payoff U J t (a t , b t ) for t = 0, . . . , N as
where τ t+1:N (l) is player 2's behavior strategies from t + 1 to N given player 2's type l, T t+1:N (l) is the corresponding set, and J t+1 = J t ∪ {a t , b t }. Similarly, define player 2's weighted future security payoff W I t (a t , b t ) for t = 0, . . . , N as
where σ t+1:N (k) is player 1's strategies from stage t + 1 to N given player 1's type k ∈ K, Σ t+1:N (k) is the corresponding set, and I t+1 = I t ∪ {a t , b t }.
For t = 1, . . . , N, U J t and W I t are |A| × |B| matrices. For t = 0, since a t , b t ∈ ∅, U J t , and W I t are scalars. The weighted future security payoffs U, W satisfy backward recursive formulas.
Lemma 1: Consider an N -stage Bayesian game Γ N (p, q) and players' realization plans x and y. Player 1 and 2's weighted future security payoffs U J t (a t , b t ) and W I t (a t , b t ) defined in (7) and (8) satisfy
Proof: According to (7) , we have
Suppose (9) holds for all t = 1, . . . , N − 1. Consider the case of t − 1.
Therefore, (9) holds for all t = 0, . . . , N − 1.
Following the same steps, (10) can be shown. Now, let us present the explicit LP formulations to compute the action history based security strategies.
Theorem 2:
Consider an N -stage repeated Bayesian game Γ N (p, q). Its game value V N (p, q) satisfies
Dually, the game value V N (p, q) also satisfies
where W I N is a zero matrix for all
.
(22)
Proof: Equation (9) . According to the strong duality theorem, (9) is rewritten as
For t = N − 1, since U J N is a zero matrix, we have
For t = N − 2, we definê
We will show that
where the element in U * J N −1 is the maximum of LP (26) and (27).
Let U J N −2 (a N −2 , b N −2 ), U J N −1 be the optimal solution to LP problem (29) and (31). Since U J N −1 satisfies (31) and hence (27), we have U *
be the optimal solution to the nested LP (33) and (34). It is easy to check that
Following the same steps, we can show the case for t = N − 3, . . . , 0. When t = 0, we have
and (11)-(13) is shown. From the definition of x in (1), we derive player 1's security strategy as in (16) . Following the same steps, we show (17)-(21) is true, and player 2's security strategy is computed as in (22).
B. Sufficient Statistic Based Security Strategies and Dual Games
Theorem 2 provides LP formulations to compute action history based security strategies for both players. Notice that action history space grows exponentially in time horizon that makes this LP formulation undesirable as the horizon length grows. In order to remedy this drawback, we now consider another type of security strategies, which depend on fixed-sized sufficient statistics.
Prior work [1] , [17] shows that a player's security strategy in the dual game with some special initial parameters is also the player's security strategy in the primal game, and the security strategy only depends on a fixed-sized sufficient statistics. However, the physical meaning and a tractable computation method of the special initial parameters are missing in [1] and [17] . This section clarifies what the special initial parameters mean in the primal game, and gives LP formulation and algorithms to compute the initial parameters and fixed-sized sufficient statistics based security strategies.
First of all, we would like to introduce two dual games of an N -stage repeated Bayesian game Γ N (p, q). Type 1 dual
is defined with respect to its first parameter p, and is specified by a seven tuple (K, L, A, B, M, μ, q), where K, L, A, B, M, q are defined in the same way as in primal game Γ N (p, q), and μ ∈ R |K| is called the initial regret over player 1's type.
Type 1 dual gameΓ 1 N (μ, q) is played in the same way as in the primal game except that at the beginning of the game, player 1's type is chosen by itself. Player 1's one stage payoff, i.e., player 2's one stage penalty, is M kl (a t , b t ) at stage t. Let p be player 1's strategy to choose his own type, and σ ∈ Σ and τ ∈ T be players 1's and 2's strategies to choose actions. Player
Type 1 dual gameΓ N (μ, q) is defined as a two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian type 1 dual game equipped with initial regret μ over K, initial probability q over L, strategy spaces Δ(K) × Σ and T , and payoff functionγ 1 N (μ, q, p, σ, τ ). Similarly, type 2 dual gameΓ 2 N (p, ν) is defined with respect to the second parameter q of the primal game Γ N (p, q), and is specified by a seven tuple (A, B, K, L, p, ν), where A, B, K, L, q are defined in the same way as in the primal game, and ν ∈ R |L| is the initial regret over player 2's type. Type 2 dual gameΓ 2 N (p, ν) is played in the same way as in the primal game except that at the beginning of the game, player 2 chooses its own type. Player 1's one stage payoff, i.e., player 2's one stage penalty, is M kl (a t , b t ) at stage t. Let q be player 2's strategy to choose his type l. Player 1's payoffγ 2 N (p, ν, q, σ, τ ) in type 2 dual game is defined as
Type 2 dual gameΓ 2 N (p, ν) is defined as a two-player zerosum repeated Bayesian type 2 dual game equipped with initial probability over player 1's type, initial regret over player 2's type, strategy spaces Σ and Δ(L) × T , and payoff functionγ 2 N (p, ν, q, σ, τ ). In both dual games, player 1 wants to maximize the payoff, while player 2 wants to minimize it.
Both dual games are finite and, hence, have game values denoted byṼ 1 N (μ, q) andṼ 2 N (p, ν). They are related to the game value of the primal game in the following way [15] 
Let μ * and ν * be optimal solutions to problems (39) and (41), respectively. Player 2's security strategy in type 1 dual gamẽ Γ 1 N (μ * , q) is its security strategy in primal game Γ N (p, q), and player 1's security strategy in type 2 dual gameΓ 2 N (p, ν * ) is its security strategy in primal game Γ N (p, q) [1] .
While Rosenberg [1] and Sorin [15] showed that the special parameters should be optimal solutions to problems in (39) and (41), it is unclear what the physical meanings of μ * and ν * are, and how to compute them. We show that μ * is the difference between 0 and the worst case payoff guaranteed by player 2's security strategy for all possible player 1's types, and ν * is the difference between 0 and the worst case payoff guaranteed by player 1's security strategy for all possible player 2's types.
Lemma 3: Consider an N -stage repeated Bayesian game Γ N (p, q). Let σ * and τ * be players 1's and 2's security strategies in Γ N (p, q), respectively. Denote by x * and y * the corresponding optimal realization plans of players 1 and 2. The optimal solution μ * to problem min μ∈R |K | 
where W * I 0 is defined in (8) , and is an optimal solution to LP problem (17)-(21).
The optimal solution ν * to max ν ∈R |L | 
where U * J 0 is defined in (7) , and is an optimal solution to linear program (11)- (15) .
Proof: First, we show
Equation (8) and (2) imply that
where σ(k) indicates player 1's strategy given player 1's type k, and y * l indicates player 2's optimal realization plan given player 2's type l. Therefore, we have
where the second equality holds because y * is player 2's optimal realization plan. Next, letting W * 0 (k) = W I 0 and I 0 = {k}, we show that
where the second equality is based on (44). According to (39), we see that −W * 0 is an optimal solution to problem (39). From the proof of Theorem 2, we see that W * 0 is the optimal solution to linear program (17)- (19) .
Following the same steps, we first show that
where U * 0 (l) = U J 0 and J 0 = {l}, and then prove that −U * 0 is an optimal solution to problem (41). Moreover, U * 0 is the optimal solution to LP (11)- (15) , according to the proof of Theorem 2.
In the primal game, the parameter μ * (k) can be seen as player 2's initial regret given player 1's type k, i.e., the difference between the expected realized payoff at the beginning of stage 1, which is 0, and the guaranteed payoff of player 2's security strategy given player 1's type k. Parameter ν * (l) is player 1's initial regret given player 2's type l, i.e., the difference between the expected realized payoff at the beginning of stage 1, which is 0, and the guaranteed payoff using player 1's security strategy if player 2 is of type l.
With the special initial parameters μ * and ν * , our next step is to find tractable computation methods to compute player 1's security strategy in type 2 dual gameΓ 2 N (p, ν * ) and player 2's security strategy in type 1 dual gameΓ 1 N (μ * , q). We first introduce sufficient statistics of player 2 in type 1 dual game, and sufficient statistics of player 1 in type 2 dual game. In type 1 dual gameΓ 1 N (μ, q), player 2's sufficient statistics is (t, l, μ t , q t ), where t is the stage, l is player 2's type, μ t ∈ R |K| is called the regret over player 1's type at stage t, and q t ∈ Δ(L) is called the belief over player 2's type. The belief q t over player 2's type is defined as
For any l ∈ L, q t+1 (l) is updated as follows:
for all k ∈ K, t = 1, . . . , N, and is updated as follows:
The game value of type 1 dual gameΓ 1 N (μ, q) satisfies the following recursive formulation [15] 
Similarly, in type 2 dual gameΓ 2 N (p, ν), player 1's sufficient statistics is (t, k, p t , ν t ), where t is the stage, k is player 1's type, p t ∈ Δ(K) is called the belief over player 1's type, and ν t ∈ R |L| is called the regret over player 2's type. The belief p t over player 1's type is defined as
and is updated as follows, with p 1 = p.
is a vector valued function whose kth element is p k + . The regret over player 2's type is defined as
for all l ∈ L, t = 1, . . . , N, and is updated as follows:
The game value of type 2 dual gameΓ 2 N (p, ν) satisfies the following recursive formulation [15] with n = N + 1 − t.
From (48), (49), (52), and (53), we see that the sufficient statistics (t, k, p t , ν t ) and (t, l, μ t , q t ) are fully accessible to players 1 and 2, respectively. With sufficient statistics, player 2 in type 1 dual gameΓ 1 N (μ, q) can first update its sufficient statistics (t, k, μ t , q t ) at stage t, then find the security strategy for the gameΓ 1 N +1−t (μ t , q t ) in the remaining stages, and use the security strategy at stage 1 inΓ 1 N +1−t (μ t , q t ) as the current security strategy. Player 1 in type 2 dual game can take the same steps to find its current security strategy based on its fixed sized sufficient statistics.
From the LP formulation of V N (p, q), we derive LP formulations to compute players' security strategies in dual games.
Theorem 4: Consider a type 2 dual gameΓ 2 N (p, ν). Let p t and ν t be the belief over player 1's type and the regret over player 2's type at stage t, respectively. The game valueṼ 2 n (p t , ν t ) of n stage type 2 dual gameΓ 2 n (p t , ν t ) satisfies the following LP formulation, where n = N + 1 − t
where U J n is a zero matrix for all l ∈ L. Player 1's security
Similarly, in type 1 dual gameΓ 1 N (μ, q), let μ t and q t be the regret over player 1's type and the belief over player 2's type at stage t. The game valueṼ 1 n (μ t , q t ) of n stage type 1 dual gameΓ 1 n (μ t , q t ) satisfies the following LP formulation, where
where W I n is a zero matrix for all
Proof: First, We havẽ Hence, (55)-(58) is shown. Player 1's security strategy at stage t in dual gameΓ 2 N (p, ν) can be seen as player 1's security strategy at stage 1 in dual gameΓ 2 n (p t , ν t ). Hence, according to (1), we haveσ * t (k, p t , ν t ) = x * I 1 /p t (k). Following the same steps, we show (62)-(65) is also true, and player 2's security strategy at stage t is as in (68). Now, let us get back to the primal N -stage repeated Bayesian game Γ N (p, q). It was shown in [1] , [15] , and [23] that if ν * is an optimal solution to max ν ∈R |L | {Ṽ 2 N (q, ν) − q T ν}, then player 1's security strategy in type 2 dual gameΓ 2 N (p, ν * ) is also the player's security strategy in the primal game Γ N (p, q). Similarly, if μ * is an optimal solution to min μ∈R |K | {Ṽ 1 N (μ, q) − p T μ}, then player 2's security strategy in type 1 dual gamẽ Γ 1 N (μ * , q) is also the player's security strategy in the primal game Γ N (p, q). Since Lemma 3 shows that ν * and μ * are the regrets over players 2's and 1's type, respectively, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5: Consider an N -stage repeated Bayesian game Γ N (p, q) and its dual gamesΓ 1 N (μ, q) andΓ 2 N (p, ν). Player 1's security strategyσ * ∈ Σ, which depends only on t, k, p t , and ν t at stage t, in type 2 dual gameΓ 2 N (p, ν * ) is also a player 1's security strategy in the primal game Γ N (p, q), where ν * is given in (43).
Similarly, player 2's security strategyτ * ∈ T , which depends only on t, l, μ t , and q t at stage t, in type 1 dual gameΓ 1 N (μ * , q) is also a player 2's security strategy in the primal game Γ N (p, q), where μ * is given in (42).
According to Corollary 5, we can compute player 1's security strategy in the following way. First, compute the initial regret, ν * , over player 2's type. Stage by stage, update p t and ν t , and compute the security strategy based on t, k, p t , and ν t in the dual game. Player 2's security strategy is computed in the same way. This corresponds to the following algorithms.
Algorithm 6: Player 1's security strategy based on fixedsized sufficient statistics 1) Initialization a) Compute U * J 0 based on LP (11)-(13). b) Set t = 1, p t = p, and ν t (l) = −U * J 0 for all l ∈ L. 2) Compute player 1's security strategyσ * t at stage t according to (61) based on LP (55)-(60).
3) Choose an action in A according toσ * t , and announce it publicly. Meanwhile, read player 2's current action. 4) If t = N , then go to step 6. Otherwise, update p t+1 and ν t+1 according to (52) and (53), respectively. 5) Update t = t + 1 and go to step 2. 6) End. Algorithm 7: Player 2's security strategy based on fixedsized sufficient statistics 1) Initialization a) Compute W * I 0 based on LP (17)- (19) . b) Set t = 1, q t = q, and μ t (k) = −W * I 0 for all k ∈ K.
2) Compute Player 2's security strategyτ * t at stage t according to (68) based on LP (62)-(67).
3) Choose an action in B according toτ * t , and announce it publicly. Meanwhile, read player 1's current action. 4) If t = N , then go to step 6. Otherwise, update q t+1 and μ t+1 according to (48) and (49), respectively. 5) Update t = t + 1 and go to step 2. 6) End. Algorithms 6 and 7 emphasize an important difference between sufficient statistic based and action history based strategies. The former must be solved for at every stage, while the latter can be computed only once at the beginning of the game. However, the sufficient statistic is of fixed size, while the size of action history (which needs to record all possible actions of both players over time) increases exponentially with time. In that sense, computation of sufficient statistic based and action history based strategies, thus, sit on opposite sides of the time/storage complexity tradeoff.
III. (1 − λ)-DISCOUNTED REPEATED BAYESIAN GAMES
A two-player zero-sum (1 − λ)-discounted repeated Bayesian game, which is simply called discounted game or discounted primal game in the rest of this paper, is specified by the same seven tuple (K, L, A, B, M, p 0 , q 0 ) and played in the same way as in a two-player zero-sum N -stage repeated Bayesian game. The one stage payoff of player 1, i.e., one stage penalty of player 2, at stage t is λ ( 
where λ ∈ (0, 1), and the game is played for infinite horizon. Correspondingly, the strategy spaces Σ and T are defined for infinite horizon. The total payoff of the discounted game with initial probability p 0 , q 0 and strategies σ and τ is defined as
The discounted game Γ λ (p 0 , q 0 ) is defined as a two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian game equipped with initial distribution p 0 and q 0 , strategy spaces Σ and T , and payoff function γ λ (p 0 , q 0 , σ, τ). As in N -stage games, in discounted game Γ λ (p 0 , q 0 ), player 1 wants to maximize the total payoff γ λ , while player 2 wants to minimize it.
The security strategies σ * and τ * , and security levels V λ (p 0 , q 0 ) and V λ (p 0 , q 0 ) are defined in the same way as in an N -stage repeated Bayesian game. Since γ λ (p 0 , q 0 , σ, τ) is bilinear over σ and τ , the discounted game Γ λ (p 0 , q 0 ) has a value V λ (p 0 , q 0 ) according to Sion's minmax Theorem [18] , i.e., V λ (p 0 , q 0 ) = V λ (p 0 , q 0 ) = V λ (p 0 , q 0 ).
Prior works [1] , [15] , [17] provide players with sufficient statistics, and recursive formulas to compute the sufficient statistics in discounted games. But the physical meaning of the initial condition, and a tractable computation method of the initial condition are missing. We clarify the physical meaning of the initial sufficient statistics, and construct LP formulations to approximate the initial sufficient statistics in this section.
Computing game value and security strategies in discounted games is nonconvex. How to find a computationally tractable approximated security strategies with the guaranteed performance is still an open problem. We provide each player with a linear program to compute its approximated security strategy whose performance converges to the game value exponentially fast.
A. Dual Games, Security Strategies, and Sufficient Statistics
As in N -stage games, players' security strategies in discounted games are strongly related to their security strategies in the corresponding dual games. To be more specific, the work in [1] , [15] , and [17] shows that player 1's security strategy in type 2 dual game of discounted game Γ λ (p, q) is its security strategy in the discounted primal game, and player 2's security strategy in type 1 dual game of discounted game Γ λ (p, q) is its security strategy in the discounted primal game. Now let us first introduce the dual games of the discounted game Γ λ (p, q).
A discounted game Γ λ (p, q) also has two dual games. A discounted type 1 dual gameΓ 1 λ (μ, q) is with respect to the first parameter p, and is specified by the seven tuple (K, L, A, B, μ, q) which is defined in the same way as in N -stage type 1 dual game. A discounted type 1 dual game is played in the same way as in an N -stage type 1 dual game except that discounted type 1 dual game is played for infinite stages. The one stage payoff of player 1, i.e., one stage penalty of player 2, is the same as the one stage payoff in discounted primal game. Let p be player 1's strategy to choose his own type. The total payoffγ 1 λ of theΓ 1 λ (μ, q) is
A discounted type 2 dual gameΓ 2 λ (p, ν) is defined with respect to the second parameter q, and is specified by the seven tuple (K, L, A, B, M, p, ν) defined in the same way as in an N -stage type 2 dual game. The discounted type 2 dual gamẽ Γ 2 λ (p, ν) is played in the same way as in an N -stage type 2 dual game, except that the discounted type 2 dual game is played for infinite stages. The one stage payoff of player 1, i.e., the one stage penalty of player 2, is λ(1 − λ) t−1 M kl (a t , b t ) at stage t, the same as the one stage payoff in the discounted primal game. Let q be player 2's strategy to choose his type. Player 1's payoff inΓ 2 λ (p, ν) is
In both discounted dual games, players 1 and 2 are the maximizer and the minimizer, respectively. Both dual games,
The game values of the dual games and the game value of the primal game satisfy the following equations [15] 
Let μ * and ν * be optimal solutions to problem (70) and (72), respectively. Player 2's security strategy in type 1 dual gamẽ Γ 1 λ (μ * , q) is also its security strategy in the primal game Γ λ (p, q). Player 1's security strategy in type 2 dual gameΓ 2 λ (p, ν * ) is its security strategy in the primal game Γ λ (p, q) [1] , [15] , [17] . While it is shown that the special initial parameters μ * and ν * are optimal solutions to problem (70) and (72), it is unclear what μ * and ν * stand for in the discounted primal game. We show in the following lemma that μ * (k) is the difference between 0 (the realized payoff at the beginning of stage 1) and the total payoff guaranteed by player 2's security strategy in the discounted primal game if player 1's type is k. Similarly, ν * (l) is the difference between 0 (the realized payoff at the beginning of stage 1) and the total payoff guaranteed by player 1's security strategy in the discounted primal game if player 2's type is l. The proof of the following lemma is the same as the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 8: Consider a discounted game Γ λ (p, q). Let σ * and τ * be players 1's and 2's security strategies. Definē
where J 0 = {l} and I 0 = {k}. The optimal solution μ * to the optimal problem min μ
The optimal solution ν * to the optimal problem
Now, we know what the initial regrets μ * and ν * mean in a discounted primal game. Let us further study the players' security strategies in the corresponding discounted dual games. Player 2 in type 1 dual gameΓ 1 λ (μ, q) has a security strategy that depends only on (l,μ t , q t ) at stage t [1] , [15] , [17] , where l ∈ L is player 2's type, q t ∈ Δ(L) is the belief over player 2's type, andμ t ∈ R |K| is called the antidiscounted regret over player 1's type. The belief q t over player 2's type is defined and updated in the same way as in an N -stage type 2 dual game. The antidiscounted regretμ t over player 1's type is
for all k ∈ K, and is updated as follows:
for all k ∈ K, withμ 1 = μ, whereμ + is a vector valued function whose kth element isμ + k . Player 1 in discounted type 2 dual gameΓ 2 λ (p, ν) has a security strategy that only depends on (k, p t ,ν t ) at stage t [1] , [15] , [17] , where k ∈ K is player 1's type, p t ∈ Δ(K) is the belief over player 1's type, andν t ∈ R |L| is called the antidiscounted regret over player 2's type. Belief p t over player 1's type is defined and updated as in an N -stage type 2 dual game. The antidiscounted regretν t on player 2' type is
for all l ∈ L, and is updated as follows:
for all l ∈ L, withν 1 = ν, whereν + is a vector valued function whose lth element isν l + . The game valuesṼ 1 λ (μ, q) andṼ 2 λ (p, ν) of discounted types 1 and 2 dual games satisfy the following recursive formulas, and the security strategies are computed by solving the problems [1] , [15] , [17] . a, b, r, p) ).
This section provides what the special initial regrets μ * and ν * are in a discounted primal game, and what players' security strategies are in dual games. The problem is that computing the initial regrets in a discounted primal game and the security strategies in discounted dual games are all nonconvex [14] . Therefore, in the rest of this section, we will focus on computationally tractable approximated solutions and the performances guaranteed by the approximated solutions.
B. Approximating the Initial Regrets μ * and ν * Computing the initial regrets μ * and ν * in discounted primal game is nonconvex, and we use the initial regrets μ and ν in an N -stage (1 − λ)-discounted primal game to approximate them. An N -stage (1 − λ)-discounted repeated Bayesian game Γ λ,N (p, q) is a truncated version of the (1 − λ)-discounted repeated Bayesian game Γ λ (p, q) with time horizon N . A twoplayer zero-sum N -stage discounted repeated Bayesian game is specified by the same seven tuple (K, L, A, B, M, p, q) as in a discounted repeated Bayesian game Γ λ (p, q) . The game is played in the same way as in a discounted game. Player 1's one stage payoff, i.e., player 2's one stage penalty, at stage t is λ(1 − λ) 1−t M kl (a t , b t ), the same as in a discounted repeated Bayesian game. The only difference between an N -stage discounted game and a discounted game is that an N -stage discounted game is played for N stages while a discounted game is played for infinite stages. Therefore, the total payoff in an N -stage discounted game is
A two-player zero-sum N -stage discounted repeated Bayesian game Γ λ,N (p, q) is defined as a two-player zero-sum discounted repeated Bayesian game equipped with initial probabilities p and q, strategy spaces Σ and T , and payoff function γ λ,N (p, q, σ, τ ).
Since an N -stage discounted game Γ λ,N (p, q) is still a finite game, it has a value denoted by V λ ,N (p, q) .
In game Γ λ,N (p, q), we define antidiscounted weighted future security payoffsŪ J t (a t , b t ) andW I t (a t , b t ) for t = 0, . . . , N − 1 as follows:
The antidiscounted weighted future security payoffsŪ and W of security strategies in an N -stage discounted game can be computed by solving LP, and our approximated initial regrets are the opposite of the corresponding optimal solutions.
Following the same steps as in Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, we construct LP's to computeŪ andW as follows.
Theorem 9: Consider an N -stage (1 − λ)-discounted repeated Bayesian game Γ λ,N (p, q). Its game value V λ,N (p, q) satisfies
whereŪ J N is a zero matrix for any J N ∈ L × (A × B) N −1 . Given player 1's security strategy σ , the antidiscounted weighted future security payoff at stage 0 isŪ J 0 for all J 0 ∈ L. N (90) whereW I N is a zero matrix for any
For player 2's security strategy τ , the antidiscounted weighted future security payoff at stage 0 isW I 0 for all I 0 ∈ K. WithŪ J 0 andW I 0 computed based on (81)-(85) and (86)-(90), according to Lemma 8, we approximate μ * and ν * as
C. Approximating Security Strategiesσ * andτ * in Dual Games
Computing security strategies in discounted dual games is nonconvex [14] . Therefore, we use game values of truncated discounted dual games to approximate the game value of discounted dual games, and then compute approximated security strategies based on the approximated game values. An N -stage (1 − λ)-discounted type 1 dual gameΓ 1 λ,N (μ, q) is a truncated discounted type 1 dual gameΓ 1 λ (μ, q) with time horizon N . Let p be player 1's strategy to choose its type. The total payoff of an N -stage discounted type 1 dual game is
Following the same steps as in [15, Proof of Proposition 4.22], the game valueṼ 1 λ,N +1 (μ, q) of gameΓ 1 λ,N +1 (μ, q) satisfies the following recursive formula: N (μ, q) is the type 1 dual game of Γ λ,N (p, q) with respect to the first parameter p, their game values satisfỹ
Similarly, an N -stage (1 − λ)-discounted type 2 dual gamẽ Γ 2 λ,N (p, ν) is a truncated version of a discounted type 2 dual gameΓ 2 λ (p, ν) with time horizon N . Let q be player 2's strategy to choose its own type. The total payoff of an N -stage discounted type 2 dual game is
The game valueṼ 2 λ,N +1 (p, ν) of the N -stage discounted type 2 dual gameΓ 2 λ,N +1 (p, ν) satisfies [15] 
withṼ λ,0 (p, ν) = min{ν}. An N -stage discounted type 2 dual gameΓ 2 λ,N (p, ν) is the dual game of an N -stage discounted primal game Γ λ,N (p, q) with respect to the second parameter q, and hence, their game values satisfỹ
Based on the relations between the game values of the discounted game, the truncated discounted game Γ λ,N (p, q), and their dual games, we have the following lemma. Lemma 10: Consider a discounted game Γ λ (p, q) and its dual gamesΓ 1 λ (μ, q) andΓ 2 λ (p, ν), and an N -stage discounted game Γ λ,N (p, q) and its dual gamesΓ 1 λ,N (μ, q) andΓ 2 λ,N (p, ν). Their game values satisfy
Proof:
λ,N sup . According to (70) and (95), we have
Let μ * and μ be optimal solutions to problem min μ∈R
According to (69) and (94), we have
Let p * and p be optimal solutions to max p∈Δ(K) {V λ (p, q) + p T μ} and max p∈Δ(K) {V λ,N (p, q) + p T μ}, respectively. If
Therefore, we conclude that for any μ ∈ R |K| and q ∈ Δ(L),
. Therefore, we prove the first equality of (99). Following the same steps, we have V λ − V λ,N sup = Ṽ 2 λ −Ṽ 2 λ,N sup . When we useṼ 1 λ,N (μ, q) andṼ 2 λ,N (p, ν) to approximatẽ V 1 λ (μ, q) andṼ 2 λ (p, ν), respectively, we are interested in how fast the approximations converge to the real game values. To this purpose, we define two operatorsF 1 andF 2 as Z, q) ).
Otherwise, we have
Hence, for any μ ∈ R |K| and q ∈ Δ(L), |F
, which implies (102). Equation (103) is shown following the same steps.
Lemma 11 further implies that our game value approxima-tionsṼ 1 λ,N (μ, q) andṼ 2 λ,N (p, ν) converge to the real game values V 1 λ (μ, q) andṼ 2 λ (p, ν) exponentially fast over N . (μ, q) andΓ 2 λ,N (p, ν) converge toṼ 1 λ (μ, q) andṼ 2 λ (p, ν) exponentially fast with respect to the time horizon N with convergence rate 1 − λ, i.e.,
Proof: Equation (79), (93), and the definition ofF 1 in (100) imply that |Ṽ 1
Let z * and z be optimal solutions to problems min z ∈Δ(L) Similarly, the game valueṼ 1 λ,N +1 (μ, q) of an N + 1-stage discounted type 1 dual gameΓ 1 λ,N +1 (μ, q) satisfies
The approximated security strategyτ † (:, μ, q) of player 2 in a discounted type 1 dual game withμ t = μ and q t = q is
Player 1's security strategy in discounted type 2 dual gamẽ Γ 2 λ (p, ν * ) is its security strategy in discounted primal game Γ λ (p, q), where ν * is the optimal solution to the optimal problem in (72). We can first transform the discounted primal game Γ λ (p, q) to a discounted type 2 dual gameΓ 2 λ (p, ν ) with an approximated initial regret ν , and then compute the approximated security strategy in the discounted type 2 dual game as its approximated security strategy in the discounted primal game. The same idea is also used to compute player 2's approximated security strategy in a discounted primal game. Finally, we will provide algorithms to compute both players' approximated security strategies.
Algorithm 14: Player 1's approximated security strategy in discounted game Γ λ (p, q) 1) Initialization a) Set N , and read parameters: k, M , p, and q. b) Given (p, q), computeŪ J 0 by solving LP (81-85). c) Set t = 1, p 1 = p andν 1 = −Ū J 0 . 2) Compute player 1's approximated security strategỹ σ † (:, p t , ν t ) according to (116) based on the LP (110)-(115) with p = p t and ν =ν t . 3) Choose an action in A according toσ † (k, p t ,ν t ), and announce it publicly. Read player 2's action b t . 4) Update p t+1 and ν t+1 according to (52) and (77). 5) Update t = t + 1 and go to step 2. Algorithm 15: Player 2's approximated security strategy in discounted game Γ λ (p, q) 1) Initialization a) Set N , and read parameters: l, M , p, and q. b) Given (p, q), computeW I 0 by solving LP (86)-(90). c) Set t = 1, q 1 = q, andμ 1 = −W I 0 .
2) Compute player 2's approximated security strategỹ τ † (:, μ t , q t ) according to (123) based on the LP (117)-(122) with μ =μ t and q = q t . 3) Choose an action in B according toτ † (l, μ t , q t ), and announce it to the public. Read player 1's action a t . 4) Update q t+1 andμ t+1 according to (48) and (75). 5) Update t = t + 1 and go to step 2.
D. Performance Analysis of Approximated Security Strategies
With players 1's and 2's approximated security strategiesσ † andτ † described in Algorithms 14 and 15, we are interested in their worst case payoffs Gσ † and Gτ † . Given player 1's strategy σ, its worst case payoff in game Γ λ (p, q) is
Similarly, given player 2's strategy τ ∈ T , its worst case payoff in discounted game Γ λ (p, q) is defined as
Because players' approximated security strategies in game Γ λ (p, q) are derived from the approximated security strategies in its dual games, their worst case payoffs in Γ λ (p, q) are highly related to the worst case payoffs in the dual games. We define player 1's worst case payoffG 2,σ in dual gameΓ 2 λ (p, ν) and player 2's worst case payoffG 1,τ in dual gameΓ 1 λ (μ, q) as
Following the same steps as in the proof of (69)-(72) in [15] , [17] , we can show the worst case payoffs G σ (p, q),G 2,σ (p, ν), G τ (p, q), andG 1,τ (μ, q) satisfy the following equations:
The worst case payoffsG 2,σ andG 1,τ in the dual games satisfy recursive formulas if σ and τ are stationary strategies.
Lemma 16: Let σ be player 1's stationary strategy that depends only on k, p t , and ν t in a discounted type 2 dual gamẽ Γ 2 λ (p, ν). Its worst case payoffG 2,σ (p, ν) satisfies
Similarly, let τ be player 2's stationary strategy that depends only on l, μ t , and q t in a discounted type 1 dual gameΓ 1 λ (μ, q). Its worst case payoffG 1,τ (μ, q) satisfies
Thus, we have
After applying the above-mentioned inequality to (138), we have for any p ∈ Δ(K) and Theorem 17 shows that the performances of our approximated security strategies of both players converge to the game value exponentially fast over N .
IV. CASE STUDY
The jamming in underwater sensor networks is originally modeled as a two-player zero-sum one-shot Bayesian game in [8] . We adopt the game model in [8] , and extend it to a repeated Bayesian game with uncertainties on both the sensors' positions and the jammer's position.
Let us assume that there are two sensors in the network that send data to a sink node through a shared spectrum at [10, 40] kHz. The distance from a sensor to the sink node is either 1 km or 5 km. The shared spectrum is divided into two channels, B 1 = [10, 25] kHz and B 2 = [25, 40] kHz. Generally speaking, channel 1 works much better for a sensor far away, and almost the same as channel 2 for a sensor close by. The sensors need to coordinate with each other to use the two channels to transfer as much data as possible to the sink node in the presence of a jammer. The jammer's distance from the sink node is 0.5 km or 2 km. While the jammer does not know the sensors' positions, the sensors do not know the jammer's position either. For every time period, the jammer can only generate noises in one channel, which can be detected by the sensors. Meanwhile, the jammer can observe whether a channel is used by a far-away sensor or a close-by sensor. The jammer needs to minimize the throughput of the two channels.
The sensors (player 1) have three types according to their position distribution, which are [1 1] (type 1), [1 5] (type 2), and [5, 5] (type 3). We consider [1 5] and [5 1] as one type. The initial distribution over the three types is p 0 = [0.5 0.3 0.2]. When playing the game, they have two choices, sensor 1 uses channel 1 while sensor 2 uses channel 2 (action 1) or sensor 1 uses channel 2 while sensor 2 uses channel 1 (action 2). The jammer (player 2) has two types according to his position, which are 0.5 (type 1) and 2 (type 2), and the initial distribution over the two types is q 0 = [0.5 0.5]. His actions are jamming channel 1 (action 1) or channel 2 (action 2). Suppose both the sensors and the jammer transmit with constant power 95 dB re νPa. A channel's capacity can be computed based on the Shannon-Hartley theorem with the average under water signal-to-noise ratio described in [8] and [19] . The payoff matrices, whose element is the total channel capacity measured by bit/second given both players' types and actions, are given in Table I . We first consider a two-stage Bayesian repeated game between the sensors and the jammer. Based on the linear program (11)-(13), we compute the sensors' security strategy shown in Table II with a security level to be 162.49 b/s. According to the linear program (17)- (19) , the jammer's security strategy is computed, and given in Table III . The jammer's security level is 162.49 b/s, which meets the sensors' security level. We then use the players' security strategies in Tables II and III in the two-stage under water jamming game. The jamming game was run for 100 times for each experiment, and we did the experiment for 30 times. The total channel capacity in the jamming game varies from 142.12 to 185.23 b/s with an average capacity to be 162.79 b/s, which is almost the same as the game value computed according to (11)- (13) and (17)- (19) .
Next, we would like to use security strategies based on fixedsized sufficient statistics in the jamming game, and see whether we can still achieve the game value. First of all, we need to verify Theorem 5. According to Lemma 3 and linear program (17)- (19) and (11)-(13), the initial regret μ * in type 2 dual gamẽ Γ 2 N (p 0 , μ * ) is [−145.45 − 179.53], and the initial regret ν * in   TABLE IV  SENSORS' SUFFICIENT STATISTICS BASED SECURITY STRATEGY IN  TWO-STAGE TYPE TWO DUAL REPEATED BAYESIAN GAMEΓ 2 N (p 0 , μ * ) GIVEN I t = (k, a 1 , . . . , a t −1 , b 1 , . . . , b t −1 ) = (l, a 1 , . . . , a t −1 , b 1 , . . . , b t −1 ) type 1 dual gameΓ 1 N (ν * , q 0 ) is [−234.77 − 141.44 − 13.38]. Player 1's security strategy in dual gameΓ 2 N (p 0 , μ * ) is computed according to the linear program (55)-(57), and given in Table IV . We see that player 1's security strategy in dual gamẽ Γ 2 N (p 0 , μ * ) is different from but very close to player 1's security strategy in the primal game Γ N (p 0 , q 0 ). The security level of σ * in the primal game is 162.49 (checked by building a linear program the same as (11)-(13) with x fixed), the game value of the primal game. Therefore,σ * is player 1's another security strategy. Player 2's security strategy in the dual gameΓ 1 N (ν * , q 0 ) is computed according to linear program (62)-(65), and given in Table V , which matches player 2's security strategy in the primal game Γ N (p 0 , q 0 ). We then run the two-stage under water jamming game using security strategies based on fixed sized sufficient statistics, and followed Algorithms 6 and 7 to take actions. For each experiment, the two-stage under water jamming game was run for 100 times, and we did 30 experiments. The channel capacity varies from 144.38 to 180.31 b/s, with an average capacity to be 162.32 b/s, which meets the game value.
Finally, we test Algorithms 14 and 15 in the discounted under water jamming game with discount constant λ = 0.7 to see whether the outcome satisfies our anticipation. In the algorithms, we set N = 3, and V λ,3 = 78.28 b/s. First, we found that the highest game value of a three-stage discounted game occurs at p 0 = [1 0 0] and q 0 = [0 1], and V λ,3 sup = 118.99 b/s. Second, we found an upper bound on V λ sup . According to (99) and (104), we have V λ − V λ,3 sup ≤ (1 − λ) 3 V λ sup , which implies that V λ sup ≤ 1/(1 − (1 − λ) 3 ) V λ,3 sup = 122.29 b/s. Third, we derive a lower bound on the security level of the sensors' approximated security strategy. According to (134), (99), and (106), we have Gσ † (p 0 , q 0 ) ≥ V λ,3 (p 0 , q 0 ) − 2(1 − λ) 4 / λ V λ sup ≥ 75.44 b/s. Finally, we get an upper bound on the security level of the jammer's approximated security strategy. According to (136), (99), and (104), we have Gτ † (p 0 , q 0 ) ≤ V λ (p 0 , q 0 ) + 2(1 − λ) 4 /λ V λ sup ≤ V λ,3 (p 0 , q 0 ) + (1 − λ) 3 ∞ t=1 λ(1 − λ) t−1 154.4 + 2(1 − λ) 4 /λ V λ sup ≤ 85.28 b/s. Therefore, our anticipated channel capacity in the discounted under water jamming game is between 75.44 and 85.28 b/s. Now, we run the discounted under water jamming game (10 stages) for 100 times. For each run, we truncate the infinite horizon discounted game to 10 stages, since the total channel capacity for the truncated stages is less than 10 −3 b/s. The average channel capacity is 82.15 b/s, which is within our anticipation, and verifies our main results in the discounted games.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games, and provides LP formulations to compute players' security strategies in finite horizon case and approximated security strategies in discounted infinite horizon case with performance guarantee. In both cases, strategies based on fixed-sized sufficient statistic are provided. The fixed-sized sufficient statistics for each player consists of the belief over his own type and the regret with respect to the other player's type. An interesting future direction is using the basic idea in this paper to study fictitious play. In fictitious play, if a player's utility function depends on not only the other players' strategies but also some private information of the other players, an estimation (belief and/or regret) of the other players' private information can be helpful.
